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STRANGI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
AND PLANNING SUGGESTIONS
By Mitchell M. Gans and
Jonathan G. Blattmachr

Mitchell M. Gans is a Professor of Law at
Hofstra University School of Law. Jonathan G.
Blattmachr is a partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP.
In Strangi, the Tax Court eliminated all estate
tax discounts for a family partnership. The
authors note it held, as it had in several prior
cases, that section 2036(a)(1) required this result.
The court then went on to reach the alternative
h o l di n g t h a t s e c t i on 2 0 3 6 (a)(2 ) l ik e w i se
precluded the estate from claiming a discount.
Gans and Blattmachr believe that while many
have taken steps to address the threat that section
2036(a)(1) poses to these partnerships, few, if any,
anticipated the court’s alternative holding and
the potentially critical threat it poses if sustained.
They argue that the alternative holding is based
on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Byrum and is inconsistent with the Service’s
own published guidance. They go on to suggest
various planning strategies for existing and new
partnerships that will neutralize this new threat,
concluding that Strangi’s alternative holding is
not on ly an imperfect solution for abusive
partnership discounts but also nothing more than
a trap for the unwary.
The authors wish to acknowledge Professor
Bridget J. Crawford of Pace University Law
School, Ellen Harrison of Shaw Pittman, Jonathan
Bell of Duane Morris, and Steve Akers of Bessemer Trust, who read the manuscript and provided insightful comments. The authors also
wish to acknowledge Paula Prudenti, whose
dedicated assistance was invaluable.
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Introduction
The Strangi family limited partnership has thus far
generated two Tax Court decisions and one Fifth Circuit decision.1 It remains to be seen whether there will
be further appellate litigation. The latest Tax Court
decision establishes a new, controversial framework,
under which many family limited partnerships will fail
to achieve the desired tax outcome.2 While prior Tax

1

Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, Doc 200031014 (48 original pages), 2000 TNT 232-12 (2000), aff’d in part
and remanded in part 293 F.3d 279, Doc 2002-14498 (4 original
pages), 2002 TNT 118-10 (5th Cir. 2002), on remand, T.C. Memo.
2003-145, Doc 2003-12584 (47 original pages), 2003 TNT 98-16.
For a discussion of the precedential weight given to memorandum decisions in the Tax Court, see Mark F. Sommer and Anne
D. Waters, “Tax Court Memorandum Opinions — What Are
They Worth?” Tax Notes, July 20, 1998, p. 384.
2
For other articles that discuss Strangi and related issues,
see Susan Kalinka, “Estate of Strangi II: IRS Wins Another
Battle in Its War Against FLPs,” Tax Notes, July 28, 2003, p.
545; Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, “Strangi III: Right Answer,
Wrong Reason? Or Just Plain Wrong?” Tax Notes, July 21,
2003, p. 373; Louis A. Mezzullo, “Is Strangi a Strange Result
or a Blueprint for Future IRS Successes Against FLPs?” 99 J.
Tax’n 45 (July 2003); Angelo F. Tiesi and Johanna J. Lond,
“How Family Partnerships Can Navigate the Section 2036
Minefield,” 30 Est. Plan. 332 (July 2003); James L. Capobianco,
(Footnote 2 continued on next page.)
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Court decisions had also threatened the tax-saving
potential that these partnerships offer, the latest
decision in Strangi poses a much more critical threat.
Nevertheless, if properly addressed, the threat can be
neutralized, both for new and existing partnerships.3

I. The Basic Facts
Two months before Mr. Strangi’s death, his son-inlaw, who was his attorney and agent, had created a
limited partnership. Acting on Mr. Strangi’s behalf as
his agent, the son-in-law transferred substantially all
of Mr. Strangi’s wealth, including personal-use assets,
to the partnership.4 In exchange, Mr. Strangi received
a 99 percent limited partnership interest. He also
received 47 percent of the stock in the corporate general
partner, which held a 1 percent interest in the partnership. His children received 53 percent of the stock in
exchange for consideration they had supplied, but then
gave a 1 percent interest to a charity shortly after the
partnership’s formation (leaving the children with a 52
percent interest).

“Are FLPs Starting to Flop?” N.J.L.J. (May 26, 2003); Lee A.
Sheppard, “Compensatory Option Sale Shelter Resolved,”
Tax Notes, July 14, 2003, p. 143; Brant J. Hellwig, “Estate Tax
Exposure of Family Limited Partnerships Under Section
2036,” 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 169 (2003); Beverly R. Budin,
“Some Thoughts on Strangi, Byrum and Section 2036,” 28 Tax
Mgmt. Est. Gifts & Tr. J. 120 (March-April 2003); Courtney
Lieb, “The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited Partnership:
How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will
Withstand Attack,” 71 U. Mo. Ks. City L. Rev. 887 (2003); J.
Joseph Korpics, “For Whom Does Kimbell Toll: Does Section
2036(a)(2) Pose a New Danger to FLPs,” 98 J. Tax’n 162 (March
2003); Jerry A. Kasner, “Applying Byrum to Family Business
Entities,” Tax Notes, July 26, 2002, p. 1741; Wendy C. Gerzog,
“A Different Take on the FLP Valuation Game,” Tax Notes,
Nov. 4, 2002, p. 683; Brant J. Hellwig, “Estate of Strangi, Section 2036, and the Continuing Relevance of Byrum,” Tax
Notes, Aug. 26, 2002, p. 1259; John A. Bogdanski, “Family
Limited Partnerships: The Open Issues,” 28 Est. Plan. 282
(June 2001); Katherine D. Black, et al., “Discounts Are Dead:
A Second Look at A. Strangi Est.,” 79 Taxes 39 (May 2001);
and Walter D. Schwidetzky, “Last-Gasp Estate Planning: The
Formation of Family Limited Liability Entities Shortly Before
Death,” 21 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2001).
3
While the court’s decision targets a deathbed family
limited partnership, its reasoning could well threaten the
minority discount concept in other contexts. For example, a
corporate shareholder who had contributed assets to the corporation at its inception might be required under the court’s
reasoning to include the date-of-death value of the contributed assets without discount in her gross estate even if she
owns, as a result of inter vivos gifts of stock, a mere 1 percent
interest at the time of death.
4
Although the court makes several references to the fact
that Mr. Strangi’s son-in-law was his agent, this fact does not
appear to have been critical to the outcome, the court having
ultimately based its decision on Mr. Strangi’s ownership of
a limited partnership interest and stock in the general
partner, and, most important, the rights inherent in these
interests.
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II. The Arguments and the Court’s Response
In the initial round in the Tax Court, the government
had argued that the partnership should be ignored and
that, as a result, no discount based on the existence of
the partnership should be permitted for estate tax purposes. In essence, the government had asserted three
different estate tax theories: (1) the partnership was an
estate-planning vehicle that was tax-driven and lacking in economic substance; (2) the partnership agreement itself constituted a restriction within the meaning
of section 2703,5 thus requiring that it be disregarded;
and (3) the partnership’s assets themselves (rather than
the decedent’s interest in the partnership) should be
included in the gross estate under section 2036 without
any discount. As an alternative to its estate tax argument, the government had also made the so-called gifton-formation argument: that, upon formation of the
partnership, Mr. Strangi had received partnership interests that were worth less than the value of the assets
he contributed to it and that he therefore made a taxable gift to that extent.
The court rejected the gift-on-formation argument
on the merits. It similarly rejected the government’s
estate tax arguments on the merits with the exception
of the section 2036 argument, which it refused to consider on the procedural ground that it was not timely
asserted. Having thus rejected all of the government’s
arguments, the court went on to reach a factual judgment as to the appropriate level of minority and
marketability discount. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded solely on the section 2036
issue, finding that the Tax Court had abused its discretion in refusing to consider the merits of the government’s argument under that section.
On remand, the Tax Court accepted the government’s section 2036 argument. It first held that full
inclusion of the partnership’s assets without any discount was required under section 2036(a)(1). It then
reached its alternative holding: that the same result
was appropriate under section 2036(a)(2).6

III. A Critical Analysis of the Alternative Holding
A. An Overview of the Analysis
The court’s 2036(a)(1) holding was not unexpected
given its prior decisions disallowing a discount where
i t fo u n d a n i mp l ie d u n de rs t andi n g t h a t th e
partnership’s assets would remain available to the

5
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
6
The court held that the entire 99 percent limited partnership interest and the decedent’s 47 percent interest in the
corporate general partner should be included in the gross
estate under section 2036 without any discount (the partnership assets attributable to the contribution made by the children in exchange for their 54 percent interest in the general
partner not being includible). However, because the Service
had not previously asserted its section 2036 theory, the
deficiency was limited by the valuation increase contained
in the notice of deficiency.

TAX NOTES, September 1, 2003
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decedent.7 In contrast, the court’s alternative holding
took many in the estate-planning community by
surprise. After all, it was based on a reading of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Byrum 8 that even the Service had previously rejected.9 Indeed, as will be argued, it misreads the decision.

The court’s alternative holding took
many in the estate-planning
community by surprise. After all, it
was based on a reading of the
decision in Byrum that even the
Service had previously rejected.
The alternative holding was, in essence, based on
the decedent’s ability to control two different aspects
of the partnership. First, acting together with others,
he could cause a liquidation of the partnership. Under
the partnership agreement, if all of the limited partners
and the general partner agreed, a liquidation would
occur. And, under the shareholder agreement, the general partner could consent to a partnership liquidation
if all shareholders voted in favor of it. Second, acting
together with his coshareholders in the general partner,
he could control partnership distributions. Because
decisions regarding partnership liquidation or distributions necessarily affect the timing of partners’
receipt of partnership assets and because the decedent
was viewed as having retained any right that could be
exercised in conjunction with others for purposes of
section 2036(a)(2), the court held that all of the
partnership’s assets were includible in the decedent’s
gross estate without any discount.10
Whereas it would seem that under section 2036(a)(1)
only the pro rata portion of the partnership’s assets
corresponding to the decedent’s limited partnership
interest should be included in the gross estate,11 full

7
See Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121,
Doc 2002-11394 (75 original pages), 2002 TNT 95-11; Estate of
Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246, Doc 200222023 (50 original pages), 2002 TNT 188-7; Estate of Reichardt v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144, Doc 2000-6219 (24 original pages),
2000 TNT 42-11 (2000). See also Hellwig, supra note 2.
8
U.S. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
9
See LTR 9415007, 94 TNT 74-22; LTR 9310039, 93 TNT
59-43; and TAM 9131006 (August 2, 1991).
10
See Alexander v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 757 (1983) (holding
that section 2036(a)(2) applies where the decedent retains the
right to affect the timing of enjoyment).
11
The court in Strangi implies that, for 2036(a)(1) purposes,
only such a pro rata portion must be included. The estate had
argued that the decedent did not receive all distributions
made by the partnership. Instead, 1 percent of the distributions were made to the general partner. Based on this, the
estate had argued that the decedent did not retain the possession or enjoyment of all partnership assets. The court,
however, rejected this argument on the ground that the only

(Footnote 11 continued in next column.)
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inclusion of all partnership assets is required if section
2036(a)(2) is applicable: For section 2036(a)(2) purposes, the decedent’s right to control the timing of the
beneficiary’s enjoyment is sufficient to bring all transferred assets back into the gross estate even though the
decedent did not herself retain any beneficial or ownership interest.12 Thus, Strangi’s alternative holding not
only expands the universe of partnerships that will fail
to achieve an estate tax discount, it also creates the
rather draconian consequence of full inclusion in the
gross estate.
If sustained, the alternative holding could eliminate
entirely discounts for partnerships where the decedent
retains any limited partnership interest or even a
minority interest in the corporate general partner.
Equally important, the retention of such an interest
could result in the inclusion of all of the partnership’s
assets in the decedent’s estate even if limited partnership interests had been transferred many years prior
to death.13 While in Strangi the decedent had retained
distributions made other than to the decedent were “de minimis.” Thus, had the decedent owned, say, a 1 percent limited
partnership interest and had distributions been properly
made to the decedent and the other partners, presumably the
court would have included only 1 percent of the value of the
partnership’s assets in the gross estate under section
2036(a)(1). To make the point in more familiar section 2036
terms, if a grantor creates a trust and retains the right to
receive 1 percent of the trust’s income, only 1 percent of the
trust corpus is included in the gross estate under section
2036(a)(1). See Treas. reg. section 20.2036-1(a). It is, however,
true that if the court were to find as a matter of fact that there
was an implied understanding that the decedent would continue to have access to all contributed assets, section
2036(a)(1) would require full inclusion. In Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121, for example, the court
held that the section mandated full inclusion. Significantly,
however, the decedent had received non-pro-rata distributions, enabling the court to infer that there was an implied
agreement to retain access to all contributed assets (though
the court does not explicitly connect the distribution pattern
to its analysis of the amount required to be included). Had
distributions in Harper been made instead on a pro rata basis,
the court presumably would have required inclusion under
2036(a)(1) of only that portion of the partnership’s assets
allocable to the decedent’s limited partnership interest.
12
See, e.g., U.S. v. O’Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966) (requiring
full inclusion where the decedent merely had the right as
trustee to control beneficial enjoyment).
13
Assuming the gift (after 1996) of the limited partnership
interests had been reported on a gift tax return containing
adequate disclosure with regard to the gift, the estate might
argue that the Service should be precluded from invoking
section 2036(a)(2) once the gift tax statute of limitations has
expired. Treas. reg. section 301.6501(c)-1(f)(5) provides that,
where an adequately disclosed gift is reported as complete,
the running of the gift tax statute of limitations will bar not
only future gift tax deficiencies but also any estate tax inclusion argument with respect to the gift. In response, however, the Service would presumably argue that the regulation
was not intended to apply in these circumstances. That is,
the gift completion rules (Treas. reg. section 25.2511-2) are
not congruent with section 2036(a)(2) (or section 2038), and
(Footnote 13 continued on next page.)
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very substantial ownership as a limited partner and as
a shareholder in the general partner, the court’s reasoning would presumably apply even if the decedent had
retained nothing more than a 1 percent limited partnership interest.14 Such a limited partner would (absent
an atypical partnership agreement) be able to join
together with the other limited partners and the general partner to cause a liquidation. Similarly, a decedent owning a 1 percent interest in the general partner,
and no other interest in the partnership, would fall
within the scope of Strangi’s reasoning because of the
retained control over liquidation and distribution
decisions (through joint action).15
Inasmuch as, under the structure of many (if not all)
family limited partnerships, the decedent does not
divest herself prior to death of all partnership interests,
the validity of the alternative holding is of critical practical significance. Although many practitioners have
taken remedial steps to address the section 2036(a)(1)
threat,16 presumably few, if any, had appreciated the
threat posed by Strangi’s construction of section
2036(a)(2). The article will first critique Strangi’s section 2036(a)(2) analysis, and in particular its reading of
Byrum. Strangi’s analytical weaknesses aside, however,
practitioners may well be inclined to assume its
validity in terms of planning for new and existing
partnerships. The article will conclude with a discussion of how new partnerships should be structured and
how existing partnerships should be restructured in
light of Strangi.

B. Section 2036: A Basic Review
Section 2036(a)(1) applies where the decedent has
retained either: (i) the possession or enjoyment of the
transferred property; or (ii) the right to the income from
the transferred property. Given the statute’s disjunctive
structure, the courts (although the Supreme Court has
not yet spoken to the question) have understandably
made clear that the retained ability to enjoy or possess

it would be inappropriate to apply the regulation in a manner
that would render them congruent. Where, for example, the
donor retains continuing control over the timing of the
beneficiary’s enjoyment, the gift is complete but the gifted
asset must nevertheless be included in the gross estate. It
would be surprising, indeed, if the statute of limitations regulation were interpreted as foreclosing the Service from invoking section 2036(a)(2) or section 2038 merely because the
completed gift had been adequately disclosed on a gift tax
return. Moreover, the Service would likely argue that it is not
attempting to include in the gross estate the asset reported
as a completed gift (i.e., a limited partnership unit), but
rather the underlying partnership assets (which had not been
reported as a gift).
14
It could similarly apply if the decedent were to retain
nothing more than a 1 percent interest in the general partner.
15
The Strangi reasoning might even apply where the decedent had retained a 1 percent stock interest in a conventional
business corporation.
16
See Hellwig, supra note 2.
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the property need not be legally enforceable.17 Thus, if
the possession or enjoyment of the transferred property
is retained under an implied understanding or agreement that the decedent would not have been able to
enforce under state law, inclusion is nevertheless required.
In contrast, section 2036(a)(2) applies only where the
decedent has retained the right (either alone or in conjunction with others 18 ) to control the beneficial enjoyment of the transferred property. An important question arising under this provision is whether the
decedent’s retained practical control is sufficient to
trigger it where state law imposes certain constraints
that narrow the scope of the decedent’s power. It was
precisely this question that the Supreme Court addressed in 1972 in Byrum.19 Many, including the Service
itself, have read Byrum as establishing the proposition
that the provision is applicable only where the decedent retained a legally enforceable right.20 And, under
this reading, if the decedent’s ability to control is circumscribed by a fiduciary duty owed to an unrelated
or related minority interest, the decedent cannot be
viewed as having retained a legally enforceable right.21
Byrum can also be read as strongly implying that the
retained ability to cause the liquidation of an entity is
too speculative to serve as a predicate for estate tax
inclusion. Yet, in Strangi, the Tax Court, as part of its
alternative holding, concluded that the fiduciary duty
that the decedent had owed to family members should
be disregarded and that his ability to cause a liquidation was sufficient to trigger section 2036(a)(2). Since
the Supreme Court has not reexamined these questions
i n t h e la st 3 0 ye ar s, Strangi’s reading of section
2036(a)(2) must be measured against Byrum’s benchmark.

C. Does Strangi Misread Byrum?
An examination of Byrum must begin with the
Court’s earlier, foundational decision in O’Malley.22 In
O’Malley, the grantor expressly reserved the right in
the trust instrument to make distribution decisions.
Under the instrument, the grantor was a trustee and,
together with his two cotrustees, had “sole discretion”
regarding distributions. The grant of discretion was not
limited by a standard, much less an ascertainable one.23
Nevertheless, under state law, the trustees remained
subject to a fiduciary duty.24 The lower courts had held

17
See, e.g., McNichol’s Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667
(3rd Cir. 1959); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305
(1969). Indeed, Strangi itself applies this principle in the
course of its section 2036(a)(1) analysis.
18
Even where the decedent could exercise the right only
in conjunction with a person having an adverse interest, the
section nevertheless applies. See Treas. reg. section 20.20361(b)(3).
19
U.S. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
20
See, e.g., LTR 9415007; LTR 9310039; and TAM 9131006.
21
See id.
22
U.S. v. O’Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
23
See id. at 630 n.3.
24
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 187, comment i.
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that this duty was not sufficiently rigorous to defeat
the section.25 When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the parties did not dispute this aspect of the
lower courts’ reasoning. Thus, the Court accepted as a
premise in the course of deciding a different issue (i.e.,
whether income accumulated in the trust should be
viewed as having been transferred by the grantor) the
notion that a grantor does not avoid the section26 by
undertaking such a relaxed fiduciary duty.27 It did,
however, intimate that it agreed with the lower courts,
stating that the grantor’s power was of “sufficient substance to be deemed the power to ‘designate’ within
the meaning of” the section.28
In Byrum, O’Malley served as the baseline for both
the majority and dissenting opinions. The decedent in
Byrum had transferred closely held stock to a trust but
reserved the right to vote the shares.29 The IRS took the
position that, because the decedent had the ability to
vote a majority of the shares, he could affect the flow
of income to the trust and that the trust corpus should
therefore be included in his estate under section
2036(a)(2).30 The majority started its analysis by observing that O’Malley was a straightforward case that clearly fell within the scope of the statute.31 In thus describing O’Malley, the majority appears to endorse not only
its holding but also the premise that a trustee’s general
fiduciary duty cannot take a reserved discretionary
power out of the statute. The majority then goes on to
limit and distinguish O’Malley, emphasizing that the
decedent in O’Malley had expressly reserved the right
to make discretionary distributions in the trust instrument.32 In Byrum, in contrast, the decedent had not
reserved any discretionary authority. 33 Instead, he
merely retained the right to vote the stock.
Although the majority failed to make entirely clear
the difference between the right reserved by O’Malley
and the one reserved by Byrum, it would seem that the
d iffe rin g n at ure of th e con s train ts impos ed by
fiduciary duty principles under state law accounts for
the different outcomes. Where, as in O’Malley, the trustee is given “sole discretion” with regard to distributions and the instrument does not contain a guiding
standard (such as support), the trustee is not subject to
a conventional fiduciary duty analysis but, rather, to a
more relaxed one. Under the relaxed standard, a trustee

25

See O’Malley v. U.S., 220 F. Supp. 30, 33-4 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
In O’Malley, the Court construed the predecessor to section 2036(a)(2). There is no relevant difference in the language between the current version of the section and the
earlier one.
27
See O’Malley at 383 U.S. at 630-31.
28
See id. See also Treas. reg. section 20.2036-1 (indicating
that a grantor’s retained discretion is sufficient to trigger the
section even though it is held as trustee).
29
See 408 U.S. at 126-27.
30
See id. at 130.
31
See id. at 136.
32
See id. at 136-37.
33
See id.
26
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has extensive discretion.34 As long as the trustee does
not have a dishonest or improper motive, courts are
not permitted to interfere with the trustee’s decisionmaking.35 Thus, the trustee/grantor in O’Malley would
have been permitted to take into account, in exercising
his discretion, his personal values and sensibilities, as
well as his views concerning the members of his family
who were beneficiaries. In contrast, in Byrum, as the
Court indicated, the decedent’s right to vote the stock
was circumscribed by a corporate fiduciary duty that
was not relaxed. Because, as a result, any use of the
decedent’s right to vote the stock to achieve his personal or family-related objectives would have been actionable,36 he did not have the requisite legally enforceable right.37
It is true that, in Byrum, in the course of discussing
the constraining nature of the fiduciary duty imposed
on the grantor and the corporate directors he could
select, the Court did allude to the fact that there were
minority shareholders unrelated to the decedent.38 This
raises the question whether the presence of these shareholders was critical to the Court’s holding. The structure of the decision, as well as the backdrop of a wellacce pted e xce ption g roun de d in fiduciary duty
principles, suggests it was not.
First, in terms of the structure, the Court did not
intend to adopt a facts-and-circumstances approach
but rather to create a bright-line test turning on
whether the grantor retained a legally enforceable
right.39 Concerned about the ability of taxpayers to rely
on clear rules in drafting their estate planning documents,40 the Court opted for the bright-line construction over the dissent’s more amorphous standard. The
Court’s ensuing discussion of the variety of constraints
that typically narrow the scope of a majority shareholder’s ability to control the flow of dividends was
an explication of the rationale for its bright-line test,
not a listing of elements that must be present in every

34
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 187, comment i.
35
See id.
36
See 408 U.S. at 138 n.11 and n.12 (indicating that a
majority shareholder must focus solely on the best interests
of the corporation and cannot promote his personal or family
interests at the expense of other shareholders or “play
favorites” among the shareholders).
37
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a conventional trust law fiduciary duty (i.e., a nonrelaxed one, unlike
the duty in O’Malley) sufficiently circumscribes the grantor’s
discretion so as to defeat the operation of section 2036(a)(2)
where the instrument does not contain an ascertainable standard. See Jennings v. Smith, 164 F.2d 74, 77 (2nd Cir. 1947)
(indicating that the Supreme Court had not yet, at that time,
decided the question).
38
See 408 U.S. at 142.
39
See Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300, 313, Doc
93-10705 (22 pages), 93 TNT 210-7 (1993) (stating that, under
Byrum, the term “right” requires that it be ascertainable and
legally enforceable).
40
See 408 U.S. at 135.
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case if the section is to be rendered inoperative.41 In
referencing the unrelated minority shareholders, the
Court was simply illustrating its point that the decedent and the directors could not violate their fiduciary
duties with impunity. Indeed, obviously anticipating
the possibility that in other cases there might not be
any unrelated shareholders, the Court also pointed to
the ability of the related shareholders to hold the decedent, as well as the directors, accountable for any
breach of fiduciary duty: The trustees, acting on behalf
of the decedent’s family members, would themselves
have had a duty, according to the Court, to seek redress
if the grantor or the directors had acted improperly.42
Thus, the structure of the decision suggests that est at e ta x in cl us ion i s appropriat e u nder s ection
2036(a)(2) only where the grantor retains a right that
is legally enforceable — that is, it can be exercised
without thereby creating a claim in a family or nonfamily member. Put differently, the decision would be
internally inconsistent if read as establishing: (i) that
the grantor’s retained right must be legally enforceable
for the provision to apply; and (ii) at the same time,
that the provision nonetheless applies even where a
family member would acquire a breach-of-fiduciaryduty claim against the grantor upon the exercise of the
putative right.
Second, in terms of the backdrop against which
Byrum was decided, a consensus had developed in the
lower courts that section 2036(a)(2) (as well as section
2038) contained an implicit exception, under which
estate tax inclusion was not required where the
grantor’s retained discretion was limited by a so-called
ascertainable standard.43 I n o t h er w o rds , if th e
grantor’s control over trust assets was subject to a standard sufficiently ascertainable so that a state court
would enforce it under fiduciary duty principles, the
exception would apply. For example, if the grantor, in
his capacity as trustee, had the discretion to make income distributions to different family members based
on their health, support, or education needs, the exception would preclude estate tax inclusion. The consensus had so solidified that the Court in Byrum did not
question its validity, with the minority explicitly alluding to it and the majority implicitly accepting the underlying logic that a fiduciary duty can be so constraining that it eviscerates what would otherwise be
considered a right.44
41
But see Hellwig, supra note 2 at 198 (2003) (indicating a
policy preference for construing Byrum as creating a facts-andcircumstances approach to enable the courts to police more
effectively abusive family limited partnerships).
42
See 408 U.S. at 142-43.
43
See, e.g., Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2nd Cir. 1947);
Hurd v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1947); Estate of
Walter E. Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947), acq. 1947-2 C.B.
44
The district court had held that Byrum’s power to remove
the trustee did not trigger section 2036 because, under the
trust instrument, the trustee’s discretion was limited by an
ascertainable standard. See Byrum v. United States, 311 F.
Supp. 892, 895 (D.C. Ohio 1970). In the circuit court, this
holding was affirmed without any explicit discussion of the
ascertainable standard issue. See Byrum v. United States, 440
F.2d 949, 952 (6th Cir.1971).
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Shortly after Byrum was decided, the Service issued
Rev. Rul. 73-143,45 where, alluding to the consensus, it
embraced the exception without reservation. In the
ruling, the Service hypothesized a trust where the grantor, as trustee, could invade principal for the benefit of
his daughter if he deemed advisable for her support
and education; the remainder was to pass upon the
daughter’s death to his grandchildren. The Service concluded that the support-and-education standard so
narrowed the scope of the grantor’s discretion that
section 2038 could not apply. In the words of the Service, where the instrument contains an ascertainable
standard, the grantor ’s power is a “nondiscretionary”
one and therefore not subject to tax.46 The rationale, the
courts have explained, is that the trust beneficiaries
could seek redress against the grantor in state court if
distributions were made or withheld in violation of the
standard.47 Thus, in the ruling, had the grantor made
e x ce s s i v e di s t ri b u t i o n s t o h is dau g h t e r, h is
grandchildren would have been entitled to damages
for his breach of duty — and, conversely, had the grantor failed to make distributions to his daughter required under the standard, she similarly would have
been able to hold him accountable.
Neither the ruling nor the cases on which it is based
suggest that the grantor’s fiduciary duty emanating
from the standard should be disregarded on the ground
that it could only be enforced by members of the
grantor’s family. To the contrary, the Service, as well
as the courts, reached the conclusion that the ability of
the family to hold the grantor accountable for a violation of the standard was sufficient to negate estate tax
inclusion.48 This treatment of intrafamily transactions
for transfer tax purposes is, moreover, not aberrational.
In the minority discount context, for example, as a
general matter, family members are treated as if they
were unrelated.49
In sum, given this backdrop, it would be difficult to
read Byrum as implying that, for purposes of section
2036(a)(2), the grantor’s fiduciary duty is irrelevant
where owed to a family member. Indeed, were Byrum
so understood, the ascertainable-standard exception
would not be tenable. For, as a practical matter, the
exception is in almost all cases applied, as in the ruling,
on the basis of a fiduciary duty that the grantor owes
to family members. Because the majority, as well as the
dissent, appeared to accept the exception, the decision
is better understood as contemplating that a fiduciary
duty, whether owed to a family member or otherwise,

45

1973-1 C.B. 407.
See id.
47
See Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74.
48
See also Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993)
(holding that section 2036(a)(2) did not apply on the ground
that the trustee had a fiduciary duty to the grantor’s family
members).
49
See Bright’s Estate v. U.S., 658 F.2d 999 (1981); Rev. Rul.
93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, Doc 93-1173, 93 TNT 19-15; but compare
section 2704 (foreclosing certain discounts in some cases
where the family can remove certain restrictions on the
ability of an entity to liquidate).
46
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is sufficient to negate estate tax inclusion. This reading
is consistent with Rev. Rul. 73-143, which implicitly
adopts the principle that a fiduciary duty owed to a
family member can so circumscribe the grantor ’s
retained discretion so as to preclude it from being characterized as a right. Given the Service’s obligation to
respect its rulings, it should not be permitted to argue
that this principle is inconsistent with Byrum without
first revoking the ruling.50
Apparently not recognizing the full scope of the
principle it had adopted in the ruling, the Service argued in Gilman51 only a few years after having issued
it that the presence of unrelated minority shareholders
in Byrum lent substance to the decedent’s fiduciary
duty that was critical to the outcome. The Service argued in Gilman that because the minority shareholders
were members of the decedent’s family, his sisters and
brothers-in-law, Byrum was distinguishable. The Tax
Court, without citing the ruling, rejected this argument
on three grounds. First, the court indicated that the
decedent’s ability to vote the stock held in a trust he
had created was sufficiently constrained by his duties
as trustee so as to make estate tax inclusion inappropriate under section 2036(a)(1). In other words, the
decedent’s fiduciary duty was a meaningful constraint
even though owed to family members. Second, the
court went on to support its conclusion by adding the
observation that the factual context suggested that the
interests of the decedent’s sisters and brothers-in-law
were adverse to his. Third, the court further supported
its conclusion by pointing out that the remaindermen
under the trust, the decedent’s grandchildren, also had
an interest adverse to his — presumably in the sense
that, as beneficiaries, they could seek redress against
the decedent were he to breach his duty as trustee.
When the court turned to section 2036(a)(2), it
rejected the Service’s position as inconsistent with
Byrum’s legally enforceable right language. It did so
without even a passing reference to the Service’s
minority shareholder argument that it had dismissed
in making its section 2036(a)(1) analysis. While the
decision might be read as standing for the narrow
proposition that the factual context indicated that the
family me mbers h ad an in terest adverse to the
decedent’s, it is more easily read as standing for the
broader proposition that a fiduciary duty is no less
constraining simply because it is owed to a family
member. Indeed, the Service itself has embraced this
reading of Byrum. In TAM 9131006,52 for example, the

50
See Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, Doc 200222803 (43 original pages), 2002 TNT 195-13 (2002) (holding the
Service bound by a taxpayer-friendly revenue ruling);
Mitchell M. Gans, “Deference and the End of Tax Practice,”
36 Real Prop. Prob & Tr. J. 731 (2002) (arguing that the Service
should be bound by such revenue rulings). See also letter from
Deborah H. Butler, Office of Chief Counsel, October 17, 2002
(indicating, in the aftermath of Rauenhorst, that the Service
will not disavow in litigation a taxpayer-friendly revenue
ruling).
51
Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 296 (1976).
52
TAM 9131006.
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Service concluded that section 2036(a)(2) did not apply
to a family limited partnership even though the decedent, as general partner, had the ability to control
partnership distributions to the limited partner donees
and even though all of the partners were related to the
decedent. It predicated its conclusion on the decedent’s
fiduciary duty. In doing so, it simply cited Gilman, as
well as Byrum, and did not even discuss or make reference to the fact that the decedent’s fiduciary duty
was owed exclusively to family members.53 Most critical, the Service appears to have endorsed this reading
of Byrum in a published ruling as well. In Rev. Rul.
81-15,54 invoking Byrum’s fiduciary-duty analysis, the
Service concluded that section 2036(a)(2) did not apply
in the case of corporate stock where the decedent had
retained voting rights even though the only shareholders were apparently the decedent and a family
trust created by the decedent. Oddly, in Strangi, while
the court made reference to the TAM and dismissed it
on the ground that it was not entitled to any weight as
a precedent, it then failed to mention the revenue
ruling, even though as suggested the Service is
obligated to respect its published rulings in Tax Court
litigation.55

D. Enforceable Rights and Joint Action
Two aspects of section 2036(a)(2) are in tension. On
one hand, the section applies only where the decedent
had a “right” to control beneficial enjoyment. And, as
the Supreme Court in Byrum interpreted the section,
only rights that are legally enforceable are within its
scope. On the other hand, the section itself provides
that it will apply where the right is exercisable either
by the grantor alone or with the consent of another
person (even if the grantor ’s exercise of the right would
adversely affect the other person’s interest56 ). Thus,
even t houg h th e right of a grantor may be circumscribed by the requirement of third-party consent,
the section nevertheless contemplates that it may be
viewed as legally enforceable. In O’Malley, as indicated, the grantor had created a trust, explicitly giving
the trustees discretion over income distributions. The
grantor being one of three trustees, he could not exercise control over distributions without the consent of
at least one other trustee. The Court held that the section applied without discussing the necessity for the
consent of another trustee. The result makes sense.
After all, the statute itself provides that it will apply
even where the grantor can only exercise the right with
the consent of another. This aspect of the statute obviously reflects the reality that, were the rule otherwise, it would be too easy for taxpayers to escape estate
tax while maintaining control through the simple expedient of a trust provision precluding the grantor
from exercising discretion without the consent of an
accommodating cotrustee (that is, a friendly cotrustee
who would be sensitive to the fact that trust assets had

53

See also LTR 9415007; LTR 9310039.
1981-1 C.B. 457.
55
See note 50 supra.
56
See Treas. reg. section 20.2036-1(b)(3).
54
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originally belonged to the grantor and who would
therefore be disinclined to disappoint the grantor).
In focusing on whether or not the grantor retains the
ability to participate in the decisionmaking process,
however, the statute draws a somewhat arbitrary line.
Where the grantor is authorized to participate, the section applies. But where the grantor instead designates
an accommodating trustee and does not retain the
ability to participate directly as a cotrustee (or otherwise), the section does not apply. Thus, it remains possible for well-counseled grantors to avoid estate tax
inclusion even where they designate an accommodating trustee and thereby retain practical control, as long
as they themselves do not have the right to participate
directly in the trustee’s decisionmaking.57
To illustrate the expansive nature of the statute, assume the trust instrument designates, as trustees, the
grantor and nine others who are hostile to the grantor
and that they are given extensive discretion (with no
standard imposed in the instrument that would guide
the discretion) regarding income distributions. The
statute clearly calls for inclusion in this case, even
though the other trustees will likely vote in a way that
frustrates the grantor’s desires. The question becomes
whether there is any limiting concept that would
render the statute less expansive in this regard. What
if, for example, an agreement is executed that contemplates that it will continue for the indefinite future
but which can be terminated if all parties consent? Is
the ability to terminate the agreement too speculative
to be considered a right within the meaning of the
statute? After all, each party has nothing more than the
ability to persuade the others that the agreement
should be discontinued.
Although Byrum did not explicitly address this
issue, it did do so by implication. The IRS had argued
that, by virtue of Byrum’s retained ability to vote the
stock, he could cause a liquidation of the corporation
and that therefore the stock he had conveyed to the
trust should be included in his estate under section
2036(a)(1). The Court, however, rejected this argument.
It concluded that, even if he had conveyed a majority
interest in the corporation to the trust, the ability to
cause a liquidation through the retained right to vote
the transferred stock would have been too speculative
and contingent to be viewed as either a right or the
kind of possession or enjoyment that this provision
contemplates.58 Section 2036(a)(1) casts a much wider
net than section 2036(a)(2): As Byrum indicates, inclusion is required under the latter provision only
where the decedent has a legally enforceable right,
whereas it is required under the former provision
where the grantor merely retains the possession or enjoyment of the transferred property under an implied

57
See, e.g., Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300, 313
(1993) (holding that section 2036 did not apply where the
grantor of the trust had retained the right to remove the trustee and replace it with a successor other than the grantor);
Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191.
58
See 408 U.S. at 150.
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understanding or agreement that is not legally enforceable.59 It would therefore appear that if the ability to
terminate an entity by liquidation is too speculative for
section 2036(a)(1) purposes, it must likewise be too
speculative for section 2036(a)(2) purposes as well.
Byrum’s implication that the right to terminate an
ongoing arrangement might be too speculative to trigger section 2036(a)(2) solidified only two years later in
Estate of Tully.60 I n Tully, th e dec e dent an d his
coshareholder each owned half of the stock in a corporation that employed them. The two shareholders,
together with the corporation, had entered into an
agreement providing for a death benefit to be paid to
the widow in the event either were to die. The Service
argued that the death benefit should be included in the
employee-shareholder ’s gross estate under section
2038 on the theory that he could have, in conjunction
with his co-shareholder,61 modified the death-benefit
agreement to alter the identity of the beneficiary. The
court rejected this argument, saying that the in-conjunction-with-any-person language in section 2038 has
its limitations: It does not result in estate tax inclusion
merely because the decedent had the ability to persuade another to modify an agreement.62
Without referencing the Court’s indication in Byrum
that the decedent’s retained enjoyment may be too
s pe cul at ive to w ar ran t in clusion u nder s ection
2036(a)(1), the Tully court obviously reached its conclusion through similar reasoning. In other words, unlike the grantor/trustee who, as a practical matter, will
often be able to persuade a cotrustee (especially an
accommodating cotrustee designated by the grantor)
concerning the administration of the trust, a person
entering into a contract contemplating its continuation
cannot be as confident about the prospects of persuading the other party to agree to bilateral modification.
Concededly, the court adopted this limitation in the
context of rejecting the government’s section 2038 argument. The same analysis ought to control, however,
in the context of section 2036(a)(2) given that it contains
the identical language regarding joint action.63 Indeed,
the Service itself in 1978, citing Byrum and Tully as well
as other lower court decisions, recognized that the
same analysis applies for purposes of both provisions
and that, under this analysis, the power to persuade
others to modify an agreement is too speculative to be
considered a right (under section 2036(a)(2)) or a power
(under section 2038).64
59

See McNichol’s Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3rd
Cir. 1959); Estate of Linderme v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 305 (1969).
60
Estate of Tully v. U.S., 528 F.2d 1401 (Cl. Ct. 1976).
61
See id. at 1404-05.
62
See id. at 1405.
63
See, e.g., Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300, 31314 (1993) (applying the same analysis in the context of section
2038 as the Supreme Court applied in Byrum in the context
of section 2036).
64
See GCM 37422 (February 23, 1978). While ordinarily
private letter rulings are not entitled to any precedential
weight, it is possible that a court would give a general counsel memorandum some deference. See Morganbesser v. U.S.,
984 F.2d 560, Doc 93-1268, 93 TNT 20-15 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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Some months after the Service had conceded that it
would be inappropriate to apply section 2036(a)(2) or
2038 simply because the decedent had the ability to
persuade others to modify an agreement, Congress
focused its attention on section 2036. Earlier (in 1976),
it had amended the section to overrule a narrow aspect
of the Court’s holding in Byrum.65 And, in 1978, shortly
after the Service’s concession, it altered the approach
it had adopted in 1976.66 Most significantly, these
amendments do not disturb the Court’s holding that
section 2036(a)(2) applies only where the decedent has
retained a legally enforceable right.67 Nor do they reject
— or even suggest disapproval of — the Service’s concession.68 Given the implication in Byrum that certain
kinds of retained control may be too speculative to fall
within section 2036(a)(2), the explicit holding in Tully,
and the Service’s recognition of its validity, there is a
rather compelling inference that Congress intended to
ratify this understanding of the section.

If sustained, Strangi will pose a threat
only to those partnerships where
appropriate advice is not secured.
In Strangi, the court concluded that the decedent’s
ability to vote with others to cause a liquidation constituted sufficient control to invoke section 2036(a)(2).
It also concluded that the fiduciary duty the decedent
had owed to his family members did not adequately
constrain his retained right to vote on liquidation or
distributions 69 and should, therefore, be disregarded.70
However understandable the court’s impulse to establish a framework that would end abusive family
partnerships, neither of these conclusions can be sustained given Byrum, Rev. Rul. 73-143, Rev. Rul. 81-15,
Tully, and Congress’s ratification of Byrum’s perceived

65
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, section 2009, 90
Stat. 1520, 1893.
66
See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, section 702(i),
92 Stat. 2763, 2931.
67
See, e.g., Estate of Wall, 101 T.C. at 311 (applying Byrum’s
“legally enforceable right” test after the enactment of the
legislation).
68
But see Kimbell v. U.S., 244 F. Supp.2d 700, 705 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (indicating that the legislation overruled Byrum). As
others have indicated, however, this is an incorrect reading
of the legislation. See, e.g., Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101
T.C. at 311 (1993) (applying Byrum without indicating that it
had been overruled by the legislation); Hellwig, supra note 2
at 199 (indicating that Kimbell’s assertion that the legislation
had overruled Byrum was overbroad).
69
If the decedent had control regarding partnership distributions and if the partnership agreement had eliminated
his fiduciary duty concerning distribution decisions, inclusion under section 2036(a)(2) would have been unquestionably appropriate. See Kimbell, 244 F. Supp.2d 700 (holding
that the ability to control distributions where the agreement
negates a fiduciary duty triggers the section).
70
The court also disregarded the fiduciary duty the decedent had owed to the charity, which held a 1 percent limited
partnership interest.
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understanding.71 Equally important, as will be shown
in the section on planning, well-advised families will
in many cases be able to structure new partnerships —
and restructure existing partnerships — without violating the Strangi framework. Thus, if sustained, Strangi
will pose a threat only to those partnerships where
appropriate advice is not secured.

E. The Bona Fide Sale Exception and Recycling
Strangi is problematic on yet another ground. In
invoking section 2036 in the partnership setting, the
Tax Court has refused to permit taxpayers to qualify
for the section’s bona fide sale exception. It has done
so on the basis of its so-called “recycling” theory, first
fashioned in the context of section 2036(a)(1)72 and now
extended in Strangi to section 2036(a)(2). Although the
court refuses to acknowledge it, the theory is inconsistent with the traditional treatment of the exception. It
also has somewhat limited application: The theory will
tend to be available to the Service in the case of families
who either are not well advised or who have more
moderate resources. Before turning to the theory directly, the exception must first be considered.
Section 2036, as do sections 2035, 2037, and 2038,
contains an exception in the case of a “bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration.” Thus, a transferor who retains the kind of control or access to the
transferred property that would ordinarily trigger section 2036 right to the income from the property transferred or the right to designate the person who will
enjoy the income is not required to include the transferred property in her gross estate if the exception applies. The courts appear to be in disagreement about
the scope of this exception. In a series of cases involving family limited partnerships, the Tax Court has
taken the view that an estate must satisfy two conditions to invoke the exception: (1) the transfer was a
“bona fide” one, in the sense that it was at arm’s length;
and (2) the decedent received full consideration in exchange for the transfer.73 On the other hand, there is a
consensus in the circuit courts reflecting the traditional
view that, if the latter condition is satisfied, the exception applies and there is no need to inquire whether
the transaction was bona fide. 74
71
See, e.g., U.S. v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,
220, Doc 2001-11045 (20 original pages), 2001 TNT 75-7 (2001)
(indicating that long-standing Service interpretation unchanged over a substantial time is deemed ratified where
Congress has reenacted the statute without altering the interpretation). See also Gans, supra note 50 at 764-75 (discussing
the reenactment doctrine). William N. Eskridge Jr., “Interpreting Legislative Inaction,” 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 73 (1988) (discussing the cases that have found Congress implictly approved of outstanding lower court decisions that were settled
at the time of enactment).
72
See Estate of Harper, T.C. Memo. 2002-121.
73
For cases prior to Strangi, see, e.g., Estate of Harper; Estate
of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246.
74
See Estate of Magnin v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1074, Doc
1999-24332 (17 original pages), 1999 TNT 138-14 (9th Cir. 1999);
Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749, Doc 97-19675 (49 pages), 97 TNT
129-14 (5th Cir. 1997); Estate of D’Ambrosio v. Commissioner,
101 F.3d 309, Doc 96-31236 (21 pages), 96 TNT 234-10 (3rd Cir.
1996).
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The difference between these two views reflects a
difference in philosophy. The circuit courts take an
objective approach. They start with the proposition
that there cannot be a taxable gift if the transaction does
not deplete the transferor’s estate.75 Invoking the notion that, at least in this context, the estate tax and gift
are in para materia and must therefore be given a parallel reading, they then superimpose on the section 2036
exception the gift tax depletion concept. As long as an
objective analysis demonstrates that the transferor
received consideration equal to the value of the transferred property as part of the exchange, no depletion
occurs, making it inappropriate to apply the gift tax at
the time of transfer or the estate tax at the time of death.
In contrast, the Tax Court takes a more-difficult-toapply subjective approach. Under the Tax Court’s view,
even if an objective analysis indicates that the transferor had received full value, the court will nevertheless reject the exception if its subjective analysis reveals
that the transaction was tax-driven (abusive) and therefore not bona fide. As a result, under the Tax Court’s
view, an intrafamily transfer implemented without adversarial bargaining could result in estate tax inclusion
under section 2036 even though the decedent had in
fact received full value for the transferred property.76
At first blush, the Tax Court’s reading of the exception is, perhaps, more defensible linguistically. After
all, had Congress intended to make the exception hinge
solely on an objective depletion analysis, the adequate
consideration language would have sufficed and there
would have therefore been no need to insert the phrase
“bona fide.” However, the general rule itself strongly
implies that the circuit courts’ reading of the exception
is a better one. Because the general rule is operative
only where the transferor has retained access to, or
control over, the transferred property, Congress necessarily contemplated that the exception would be available where the transferor has retained such access or
control. And because control or access is not typically
retained where parties deal at arm’s length but rather
in the context of an intrafamily arrangement, the Tax
Court’s reading of the exception as requiring an arm’slength component is difficult to justify. Previously, the
Service itself had implicitly acknowledged that the
phrase did not carry the significance the Tax Court now
attributes to it, reading the same phrase in section 2035
to permit the exclusion of life insurance from the estate

75
Conversely, not every transaction that results in depletion
produces a taxable gift. Where it can be established that the
depletion occurred in an arm’s-length setting on account of a
mistake about value, as distinguished from a transaction
driven by donative intent, the ordinary-course-of-business exception immunizes the transaction from the gift tax. See Treas.
reg. section 25.2512-8.
76
The Tax Court would presumably avoid a “double inclusion” by permitting the estate to reduce, under section
2043, the amount required to be included under section 2036
by the amount of the consideration received.
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without examining the obvious tax-driven motivation
for the transfer.77
This is not to suggest that, if the Tax Court reading
were rejected, the phrase would be entirely meaningless. If, for example, a facade is erected creating the
false impression that the transfer was made in exchange for consideration, the transaction would not be
bona fide and the exception therefore would not apply.
Put differently, the phrase prevents taxpayers from
qualifying for the exception on the basis of a sham or
illusory consideration.78 Under the circuit courts’ view,
this is precisely the limited function that the phrase is
designed to serve.79
Indeed, until its decision in Harper, the Tax Court
itself had so construed the phrase. In Harper,80 however,
the court, striking down what it perceived to be an
abusive family limited partnership, inflated the significance of the phrase. In doing so, it failed to
acknowledge that it was altering its approach. Instead,
it mischaracterized the authority on which it relied. In
Goetchius,81 the only direct authority cited by Harper,
the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s exception-based
argument. But, contrary to Harper’s reading, the court
did not invest the phrase with any new significance. It
simply held that the decedent had not received consideration for the transfer and that, as a result, depletion occurred.82 The court even intimated that the exception would have applied had the decedent received

77
See LTR 9413045. For a discussion of this ruling, see
Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Mitchell M. Gans, “Life Insurance
and Some Common 2035/2036 Problems: A Suggested
Remedy,” Trusts and Estates (May 2000).
78
Treas. reg. section 20.2036-1 indicates that the exception
applies where there is “adequate and full consideration.” It
does not mention any requirement that the sale also be a bona
fide one. It does, however, cross-reference Treas. reg. section
20.2043-1(a), which does appear to contemplate the need to
satisfy two conditions for the exception to apply: that the sale
be a bona fide one and that the consideration be adequate.
Nonetheless, the latter regulation is not inconsistent with the
traditional (Wheeler’s) understanding of the exception. Its use
of the phrase “bona fide” is obviously designed to do nothing
more than make certain that the consideration was actually
supplied and not an illusory one. Indeed, the last sentence
of the provision confirms this reading. It provides that, if the
value at the time of death of the transferred asset to be included under section 2036 (or similar section) exceeds the
consideration received by the decedent, only the excess is
included in the gross estate. The failure to require that the
sale be a bona fide one to qualify for treatment under this
last sentence makes it clear that it was intended to embrace
the traditional understanding of the exception.
79
See, e.g., Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 1997).
80
Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121.
81
Estate of Goetchius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 495 (1951).
82
The decedent did not receive any consideration in exchange for the transfer. Instead, under the agreement, the
consideration was given to the decedent’s brother. To prevent
the tax-free depletion of the transferor ’s estate, the court held
that the estate did not qualify for the exception.
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the consideration in exchange for the transfer.83
Goetchius, therefore, is consistent with the circuit
courts’ approach and cannot be properly viewed as
modifying the phrase’s traditional, limited role.
In Strangi, given the court’s earlier conclusion in its
initial decision that no taxable gift had been made at
the formation of the partnership84 — implicitly recognizing that depletion had not occurred — the estate
qualified for the exception unless precluded from
doing so by the phrase. Under the so-called “recycling”
theory the court had created in Harper, however, the
phrase renders the exception inapplicable where the
decedent contributes assets to a partnership in exchange for all partnership interests without any simultaneous contribution by others.85 That is, a taxpayer
who stands on both sides of the transaction, as transferor and as the only meaningful partner in the transferee, cannot claim that it is a bona fide one and is
therefore not eligible for the exception — even though
it did not produce depletion. Relying on the “recycling” gloss Harper had imposed on the phrase, the
court in Strangi concluded the estate could not qualify
for the exception.86
The court, however, failed to acknowledge that the
Fifth Circuit, the court having appellate jurisdiction, is
among the circuit courts explicitly adhering to the
traditional view.87 Indeed, the court did not even mention the relevant Fifth Circuit decision.88 And, in distinguishing a district court decision that had been affirm ed by th e F ift h Circuit (w ithou t p ublish ed
opinion),89 the court did not reference the district
court’s conclusion, based on the prior Fifth Circuit
precedent, that the exception necessarily applies whene v er t h e o ri g in a l tr a n sfe r di d not dep l et e th e
transferor’s estate and therefore did not constitute a

83
See id. at 505 (stating that the “receipt of ‘adequate and
full consideration’ can intervene to avoid the tax only if the
facts show that the transfer of property in question does not
cause a depletion of the transferor’s estate.”).
84
See Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. 478, 489-90; see also Jones v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 121, 127-28, Doc 2001-6611 (34 original
pages), 2001 TNT 45-12 (2001) (explaining the holding in the
initial Strangi decision that no gift occurs at partnership formation if the taxpayer continues to own an interest in the
entity and received appropriate credit in the entity’s capital
accounts for the amount contributed).
85
But see Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2002-246, where the court refused to apply the exception even
though the decedent’s children had also contributed assets
to the partnership. In effect, the court disregarded their contribution on the ground that, under the partnership agreement, all transactions relating to the assets they had contributed would be allocated to them.
86
See Strangi, T.C. Memo. 2003-149.
87
See Wheeler, 116 F.3d 749.
88
See id.
89
Church v. United States, 85 AFTR 2d para. 2000-804, 2000-1
USTC par. 60,369, Doc 2000-4369 (15 original pages), 2000 TNT
30-56 (W.D.Tex. 2000), aff’d without published opinion 268 F.3d
1063, Doc 2001-21057 (3 original pages), 2001 TNT 152-12 (5th
Cir. 2001).
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taxable gift. 90 Because the Tax Court follows controlling
circuit court authority under its Golsen91 rule, perhaps
the court was simply unaware that its rejection of the
exception, notwithstanding the decedent’s receipt of
full consideration, was inconsistent with the Fifth
Circuit’s approach.
In creating its recycling theory, the Tax Court was
obviously motivated by its strong distaste for what it
views as abusive family limited partnerships. Having
previously rejected the Service’s argument that Strangi
made a taxable gift at the time of partnership formation,92 as well as the argument that the partnership
should be ignored because of the absence of a business
purpose,93 the court understandably tried to “smuggle” the tax-driven nature of the transaction back into
the calculus. Although the recycling theory does accomplish this objective, it deviates from the traditional
understanding of the exception. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the theory will only present
an obstacle for taxpayers who are not well advised or
whose children (or other heirs) have insufficient independent resources. To illustrate, consider a wella dv i s e d f a m il y w h e r e t h e c h il dre n h a ve i n dep e n d e n t wealth. If the parent were to form the
partnership and her children were simultaneously to
contribute assets in exchange for a partnership interest,
the theory would have no application and the partnership would withstand the Tax Court’s section 2036
analysis as long as the requisite business purpose was
present.94 In short, the section 2036 solution that the
Tax Court has devised to close down these partnerships
is, to be sure, an imperfect one. If the court’s rejection
of the Service’s gift-on-formation and business-purpose arguments is not modified, new legislation replacing the Tax Court’s section 2036 approach with a model
more effectively targeting family-partnership abuse
would be salutary.

90

See id.
Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
92
See Strangi, 115 T.C. 478 at 489-90.
93
See id.
94
In explaining its recycling theory in Harper, the court
failed to clarify fully its contours. It remains unclear whether
a contribution by others would be sufficient to avoid the
theory if investment assets, as opposed to business-type assets, were contributed. In Strangi itself, the decedent’s children had contributed their own assets to the corporate general partner in exchange for their 53 percent interest, and the
court nonetheless invoked the theory. Whether this was attributable to the fact that personal-use assets had been contributed to the partnership, to the fact that so much of the
decedent’s wealth was in the partnership, or to the fact that
it was essentially a deathbed transaction remains uncertain.
It is also not entirely clear whether the theory would apply
where there is only one person who makes the contribution
but does so for a nontax purpose (e.g., where the partnership
is formed for creditor protection purposes).
91
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IV. Planning: How to Neutralize the Threat
A. Existing Partnerships
Given Strangi’s alternative holding, it is critical for
existing partnerships to consider restructuring. Where,
under any existing partnership arrangement, a limited
partnership interest or an interest in the general
partner carrying the right to vote with respect to liquidation or distributions is retained until death, section
2036(a)(2), according to Strangi, requires that all assets
that the decedent had contributed to the partnership
be included in the gross estate without discount. As
indicated, this undiscounted, full-inclusion rule applies under Strangi’s reasoning even if the decedent
had made extensive gifts of limited partnership interests many years prior to death. To avoid this outcome,
it is necessary that the decedent’s right to vote on liquidation and distributions be eliminated prior to death.
An inter vivos gift of all interests in the partnership (as
well as any interest in the general partner) would be
the most straightforward method by which to achieve
this, for section 2036(a)(2) can apply only where the
right to control the transferred property remains intact
at the time of death. And if the limited partnership
interest and the interest in the general partner are
gifted before death, the decedent would no longer have
the voting rights at the time of death. Two practical
difficulties, however, will be encountered if the inter
vivos gift approach is utilized. First, a gift could
produce a gift tax liability, which many taxpayers may
find unattractive (especially in light of the possible
repeal of the estate tax95 ). Second, any gift occurring
within three years of death may be disregarded under
section 2035.
In terms of the gift tax, assuming there is an unwillingness to tolerate the potential liability and that the
remaining unified credit is not sufficient to offset it, a
restructuring of the partnership agreement to create
two different classes of limited partnership interests
may be an effective strategy. Under this strategy, the
partnership agreement would be amended to create
two different classes of limited partnership interests:
one in which all voting and liquidation rights are concentrated, and the other having no such rights. The
amendment itself should not produce a taxable gift
because, after the amendment, the taxpayer still owns
all limited partnership interests and still possesses all
of the preamendment voting rights. If the interest carrying the voting rights were, say, a 1 percent interest,
a gift of this interest should not produce any significant
gift tax liability given its relatively modest value. Nor
should the gift (if made a reasonable period of time

95
See Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Lauren Detzel, “Estate
Planning Changes in the 2001 Tax Act — More Than You Can
Count,” 95 J. Tax’n 74 (2001).
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after the amendment is adopted96 ) or the amendment
cause a lapse to occur under section 2704(a) inasmuch
as the voting rights are not eliminated but merely transferred to another.97 Even assuming Strangi’s alternative
holding is valid, section 2036(a)(2) could no longer
apply with respect to the partnership’s underlying assets given that the power to affect these assets by
voting on liquidation or distributions would cease to
be held by the donor once the gift was made.98
While this strategy may minimize potential gift tax
liability, it doesn’t eliminate it. It could, however, be
eliminated under a different strategy: by transferring
the interests carrying the problematic voting rights to
a trust containing provisions that render the gift incomplete for gift tax purposes.99 For example, a limited
partner or a shareholder in the general partner who
has such voting rights could convey the interest(s) to
a trust under which she would retain the right to
modify the interests of the beneficiaries. The retained
modification power would render the gift incomplete
and would therefore defeat the gift tax.100 At the same
time, section 2036(a)(2) would be rendered inoperative
in terms of the partnership’s underlying assets, for the
grantor’s power to affect these assets by voting on
liquidation or distributions would cease to exist upon
the trust’s creation.101 Instead, the voting rights would
be held by the trustee (the grantor might even be

96
If made simultaneously with the amendment, the Service
might argue that the transfer of the voting rights with respect
to the retained portion of the limited partnership is a “naked”
transfer. The section 2704 regulations, according to the argument, contemplate that a transfer of an interest will not trigger
the section merely because voting rights are inherent in the
transferred interest, see note 97 infra, but they don’t go on to
provide that the transfer of voting rights without a simultaneous transfer of an equity interest in the entity is similarly
beyond the scope of the section.
97
See Treas. reg. section 25.2704-1(f) example 7. See also
Preamble to Proposed Regulations under section 2704, 56 Fed.
Reg. 46245-01 (September 11, 1991) (“The proposed regulations provide generally that a lapse of a right occurs when
the right is reduced or ceases to exist. Generally, a transfer
of an interest conferring a right is not a lapse of that right
because the right is not reduced or eliminated”). Note, however, that if the interest the transferor retains is a subordinate
interest (e.g., common stock is retained while preferred stock
is transferred), a taxable lapse might occur. See Treas. reg.
section 25.2704-1(c)(1) (last sentence).
98
If the taxpayer held an interest in the general partner in
addition to the limited partnership interest, the same result
could be achieved if a gift of the interest in the general
partner were made after first amending the agreement to
concentrate all voting and liquidation rights in the general
partner.
99
See Treas. reg. section 25.2511-2.
100
See id.
101
By a parity of reasoning, the same conclusion regarding
section 2036(a)(2) would apply if the interests were instead
transferred to a trust in a transaction constituting a completed gift. As Byrum makes clear in the context of a completed gift in trust, provided the trustee is independent, the
grantor is not viewed as having a power simply because it is
held by the trustee.
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named a cotrustee as long as only the nongrantor
trustee has the authority to vote on these issues
under the trust instrument).102 To be sure, the interests
held in the trust would themselves be included in the
gross estate under section 2036(a)(2) because of the
modification power. However, these interests would be
valued with the appropriate discount taken into account. Thus, in the case of an existing partnership,
Strangi’s alternative holding can be easily avoided
without incurring any gift tax liability.103

The more difficult hurdle is section
2035.
For those who are made uncomfortable by the loss
of control resulting from a transfer to the trust of the
ownership interest in the general partner, as well as
the limited partnership interest, a variation on the suggested incomplete gift trust might be affective. Under
this variation, ownership in the general partner would
be retained, with only the limited partnership interest
conveyed to the trust. Although the retention until
death of the ownership interest in the general partner
would, if it carried the right to vote on liquidation or
distributions, cause Strangi’s alternative holding to
ap ply, it is a rg uable that only a portion of the
partnership’s assets would thereby become includible

102
For individuals who are reluctant to relinquish completely all access to partnership assets, one might consider authorizing the trustee to make distributions on a discretionary
basis to the grantor. The right of the trustee to vote, the limited
partnership interests should not, by virtue of the trustee’s
discretion regarding distributions, be attributed to the grantor. As suggested, Byrum indicates that the discretionary authority of an independent trustee is an inappropriate predicate
for utilizing section 2036(a)(2). While, under Byrum’s reasoning, section 2036(a)(2) should not apply with respect to the
partnership’s assets even if the trust is located in a state that
follows the common-law self-settled trust rule allowing the
grantor ’s creditors to reach trust assets, see Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, section 156, it might be advisable as a practical matter to locate the trust in a state that has overruled the
common-law rule to prevent the Service from distinguishing
Byrum on the ground that, unlike Byrum, the grantor of such
a self-settled trust can effect its termination. See Commissioner
v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958).
103
It would seem that the grantor might be able to retain
indirect control over the trustee. For example, the trust instrument might provide that the grantor could remove the
trustee and appoint a successor. It could not, however, authorize the grantor to revoke the trust or to appoint herself as
trustee (or to appoint certain other related parties). For, as
long as the provision is drafted to qualify for the safe harbor
of Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191, Doc 95-7666 (5 pages), 95
TNT 153-15, the voting rights held by the trustee should not
be reattributed to the grantor. Indeed, in Byrum itself, the
court indicated that the decedent’s right to vote stock he had
transferred to a trust did not require inclusion under section
2036(a)(2) inasmuch as any trust distributions were dependent on the discretion of what the court called an “independent trustee” — although it is interesting to note that,
under the instrument, the decedent had the power to remove
and replace the trustees.
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in the estate. If, for example, the decedent owned a 47
percent interest in the general partner, the general
partner held a 1 percent interest in the partnership and
the 99 percent limited partnership interest were held
in the trust, Strangi’s alternative holding might only
apply with respect to 1 percent of the partnership’s
underlying assets.104 For even though the decedent
could vote with regard to the interest in the general
partner, 99 percent of any distribution or any liquidation proceeds would flow into the trust and become
subject to the trustee’s discretion. And, as Byrum suggests, the use of a trust as an intermediary sufficiently
blunts the control inherent in the retained voting right
to avert application of section 2036(a)(2):105 In the
course of reaching its conclusion, the Court indicated
that the decedent’s ability to vote the stock he had
transferred to a discretionary trust could not trigger
the provision because any distribution he caused the
corporation to make would inure to the benefit of the
trust beneficiaries chosen by the trustee in the exercise
of discretion.106 Thus, conveying the limited partnership interests to an incomplete gift trust, even though

104
Indeed, the initial Tax Court decision in Strangi confirms
this, inasmuch as the court was willing to permit a discount
even though the decedent held a 47 percent interest in the
general partner and a 99 percent limited partnership interest.
If, in the example in text, the decedent instead owned a controlling interest in the general partner, the Service would presumably deny all discount with respect to the decedent’s
limited partnership interest on the ground that the interest in
the general partner and the limited partnership interests
should be aggregated for valuation purposes even though
includible in the gross estate under different sections. See Rev.
Rul. 79-7, 1979-1 C.B. 294 (aggregating two items includible
in the gross estate under two different sections for valuation
purposes); Estate of Fontana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 318, Doc
2002-7744 (10 original pages), 2002 TNT 61-11 (2002) (applying
the IRS’s aggregation theory in terms of valuing property
includible under section 2041 and section 2033). But compare
Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26, Doc 1999-3887
(34 original pages), 1999 TNT 17-6 (1999) (rejecting the IRS’s
aggregation theory in the context of a QTIP trust includible
under section 2044).
Finally, it should be emphasized that retaining the 47 percent interest, as suggested in text, is not a risk-free strategy.
For the Service might argue that Strangi’s alternative holding
should be extended to apply in this context, making its
reasoning even more attenuated. Borrowing from Strangi, the
Service would presumably argue that section 2036(a)(2)
should apply on the ground that the right to vote the 47
percent interest with respect to liquidations or distributions,
together with the power to modify the interests of the trust
beneficiaries, had enabled the decedent in effect to control
the beneficial enjoyment of the partnership’s assets. It might
therefore be prudent, if this approach is utilized, to eliminate
the right to vote on these issues inherent in the 47 percent
interest.
105
408 U.S. at 143.
106
In Byrum, the Court used the term “independent” in
describing the trustee, which would suggest the need for
caution in terms of trustee selection. However, as indicated,
see note 103 supra, the decedent had the right to remove and
replace the trustee, and this apparently did not dissuade the
Court from so characterizing the trustee.
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influence over the partnership is retained through an
ownership in the general partner, might arguably
a void t h e imp ac t of Strangi’s alternative holding
without causing a taxable gift to occur.107
The more difficult hurdle is section 2035. If death
were to occur within three years of transferring the
interest(s) to the trust (or, if the concentration-ofvoting-rights strategy is utilized, within three years of
gifting an interest carrying the problematic voting
rights), assuming Strangi’s alternative holding is valid,
all of the partnership’s underlying assets that had been
originally contributed to the partnership by the decedent would be included in the gross estate under section 2035 without any discount.108 That is, whenever a
section 2036(a)(2) right is initially retained but then
subsequently relinquished or transferred within three
years of death, section 2035 in effect creates the fiction
that the decedent had retained the right until the time
of death. Thus, a gift or transfer of the interest(s) will
defeat Strangi’s alternative holding only if made outside the scope of section 2035’s three-year window.109
If the interest(s) were sold instead of gifted, section
2035’s bona fide sale exception might apply. Under the
exception, a full consideration sale is not subject to the
section even if the seller should die within the threeyear window. Thus, provided that the voting rights are
relinquished in a full consideration sale, the section’s
three-year rule will not apply. The critical question is
how to determine what constitutes full consideration.
In Allen,110 the leading case construing the exception,
107
Note that, in Strangi, the court rested its alternative holding, in part, on the decedent’s ability to vote his 47 percent
interest in the general partner. What distinguishes the structure suggested in text from the Strangi structure is the trust.
In Strangi, the decedent continued to hold until death outright
ownership of the limited partnership interests. In the suggested structure, in contrast, the interposition of the trust
blunts, as in Byrum, the ability to exercise influence over the
beneficial enjoyment of the partnership’s assets.
108
The assets contributed to the general partner would
similarly be included in the gross estate.
109
It is unclear whether the transfer of an interest to an
incomplete gift trust would constitute a transfer or relinquishment within the meaning of section 2035.
110
Where there is concern about Strangi’s alternative holding and limited partnership interests have already been
gifted, a liquidation of the partnership might preserve at least
a portion of the discount. That is, Strangi’s alternative holding presumably could not reach any assets once they are
distributed at liquidation to the donee limited partners.
Nevertheless, if the liquidation were to occur within three
years of death, the Service would likely attempt to apply
under section 2035, together with Strangi’s alternative holding, in seeking to deny the discount. While it is unclear
whether a liquidation would constitute a transfer or relinquishment under section 2035, the Service would certainly
maintain that, in consenting to the liquidation, the decedent
had undertaken a sufficiently volitional act to make the section applicable. S ee TAM 199935003, Doc 1999-28573 (7
original pages), 1999 TNT 172-21 (concluding that there was
sufficient volition on the part of the decedent to trigger the
section). Other than the TAM, there is no authority clearly
indicating that volition is required under the section. Note,

(Footnote 110 continued in next column.)
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the grantor had created a trust under which she
retained the right to receive income. Shortly before her
death, recognizing that the full corpus would be included in her gross estate under section 2036(a)(1) if
she retained the right until death, the grantor sold her
remaining life estate for its value at that time. The sale
having occurred within the three-year window, the Service included the full value of the trust corpus in her
gross estate under section 2035. In rejecting the estate’s
exception-based argument, the court held that the
grantor does not receive full consideration within the
meaning of the exception unless she receives an
amount equal to what would have been included in the
gross estate had the sale not occurred. So if the value
of the trust corpus at the time of death is, say, $1 million
and the grantor sells her life estate the moment before
death for its value of, say, $1,000, the exception does
not apply and the entire corpus is included in the gross
estate. To make the exception applicable in this example, the grantor would have to receive a consideration of $1 million for the remaining life estate.
The court’s holding created a rather anomalous outcome: It requires that the grantor receive a consideration in excess of the life estate’s value, with the
purchaser thereby making a taxable gift to the grantor,
for the sale to be sufficiently bona fide to come within
the exception. Nevertheless, Allen remains viable.111
Given Allen, as a practical matter, the use of the
exception in the restructuring of an existing partnership may be available only for married couples. To
illustrate, assume a partner has a 99 percent limited
partnership interest and virtually all of the stock in the
general partner and that both interests carry voting
rights that would trigger Strangi’s alternative holding.
Assume further that the partnership’s assets have a
however, that section 2036(b) may contemplate that its threeyear rule can apply even in the absence of volition in that a
mere “cessation” of voting rights during the three-year window is subject to the section. Perhaps Congress’s use of such
a passive word in section 2036(b) implies that it contemplates
that the words “transfer” and “relinquished” in section 2035
are to be understood as requiring more active or affirmative
conduct. Cf. Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653
(1986) (indicating that volition is an essential component of
a taxable gift).
For those unwilling to assume the section 2035 risk that
liquidation entails, there is another strategy that might
prevent Strangi’s alternative holding from applying to the
portion of the partnership assets corresponding to the limited
partnership interests held by donees: If the donees were to
transfer their interests to an incomplete-gift trust, it would
seem that, as Byrum indicates, section 2036(a)(2) could not
apply to that portion of the partnership’s assets attributable
to the transferred interests. See note 102 supra. And since the
transfer by the donee partner could not be viewed as a volitional act by anyone else, section 2035 would appear to be
inapplicable as well.
111
See, e.g., Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749, Doc 97-19675 (49
pages), 97 TNT 129-14 (5th Cir. 1997). But see LTR 9413045
(concluding that the sale of incidents of ownership in a life
insurance policy for less than its face value was for a sufficient consideration such that section 2035 did not apply); for
a further discussion of this ruling, see Blattmachr and Gans,
supra note 77.
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value of $10 million, but that the partnership interests
have a value of $7 million when discount is taken into
account. Recognizing that under Strangi the discount
would be unavailable and seeking to shed the voting
rights without making a taxable gift while qualifying
for the section 2035 exception, the partner sells the
interests for their discounted value of $7 million. Since
the sales price is equal to the value of the interests, no
taxable gift occurs. 112 And Strangi’s alternative holding
would no longer apply inasmuch as the partner would
not have the voting rights at the time of death. The
exception, however, would be unavailable, thus requiring a full inclusion of $10 million if the partner were
to die within three years of the sale.113 For, under Allen,
for the exception to apply, the sales price would have
to be $10 million.114 Allen, therefore, makes the use of
exception problematic: To qualify, the partner would
have to sell the interests for a price that would result
in the purchaser making a taxable gift to the partner
and that would, in turn, inflate the partner ’s estate.115
If, however, the partner were married and sold the
interests to her spouse,116 because of the marital deduction, the sales price could be set at the amount that
would bring the transaction within the exception ($10
million) without triggering a taxable gift. So, in this
example, with the purchasing spouse paying $10 million for the interests, there would be no taxable gift and
no section 2035 inclusion even if the selling spouse
were to die within three years117 (as well as no taxable
112

See Treas. reg. section 25.2512-8.
The estate would, of course, be entitled to an offset for
the $7 million received in the sale under section 2043, making
the estate taxable in effect on the entire $10 million (the $7
million actually received plus the $3 million taxable under
section 2035 once the offset is taken into account).
114
Note that Allen’s interpretation of the bona fide exception in section 2035 is incongruous with the traditional
understanding of the exception under section 2036. In other
words, under the traditional understanding of the exception,
if the decedent had received full consideration such that no
depletion occurred, the exception applies. Yet, in Allen, even
though the decedent sold the remaining life estate for its
value and therefore made no taxable gift, the court included
the full value of the corpus under section 2035. The court in
Wheeler, not unaware of Allen, limited it on the ground that
it was driven by a concern about the tax abuse that would
otherwise ensue were section 2035 read as permitting the
exception to apply in the Allen context. It appears, therefore,
that the bona fide exception under section 2035 is not identical to its counterpart in sections 2036, 2037, or 2038.
115
If the purchaser were to pay $10 million, the price required for the partner to come within the exception, she
would be paying $3 million more than the value assigned to
it for gift tax purposes and would therefore be deemed to
make a taxable gift of $3 million. See Treas. reg. section
25.2512-8.
116
The marital deduction would, of course, only be available if the transferee spouse is a U.S. citizen. See section
2523(i).
117
The Service would presumably argue that, because of
the tax-driven, intrafamily nature of the transaction, the exception should not apply. This, however, would violate the
spirit of Allen, which focuses on the question of estate depletion and not whether the transaction is otherwise bona fide.
113
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gain for income tax purposes118 ). While the selling
spouse’s estate would be increased as a result of the
sale (receiving $10 million in consideration for the interests valued on a discounted basis at $7 million), the
purchasing spouse’s estate would be concomitantly
decreased (after making the purchase at a price of $10
million, the purchasing spouse would have interests
valued at only $7 million).119 Thus, while leaving the
couple’s aggregate estate tax wealth unaffected, the
interspousal sale may enable a partner concerned
about Strangi’s alternative holding to eliminate the
problematic voting rights before death and thereby
preserve the discount — all without producing a gift
tax, without triggering section 2035, and without causing a taxable gain for income tax purposes.
In sum, in the case of existing partnerships where
problematic voting rights have been retained, caution
suggests that the interests carrying these rights be
transferred. For those concerned about gift tax liability,
an incomplete gift trust may provide an attractive solution, although section 2035 will cause the plan to fail
if death should occur within three years of funding the
trust. Where, however, a married couple is involved,
the ability to avoid section 2035 makes the interspousal
sale the approach of choice.

B. New Partnerships
In terms of structuring new partnerships, Strangi
itself suggests a straightforward method for avoiding
its alternative holding. If other members of the family
also contribute assets to the partnership at the time of
formation in exchange for partnership interests and
each receives a partnership interest equal in value to
their contribution, Strangi indicates a willingness to
treat the transaction as a so-called “pooling.” If it qualifies, section 2036’s bona fide sale exception would
preclude the section from being applied at the death of
any contributing partner.120 Two caveats are necessary,
however. First, Strangi is prepared to make the exception available only if the partnership has a business
purpose. Second, it is presumably necessary for each
contributing partner to use independent wealth; other118

See section 1041.
At the death of the purchasing spouse, Strangi’s alternative holding could not apply, for 2036 applies only where
the decedent made the transfer of the assets sought to be
included under the section. And, as long as the selling
spouse’s contribution of assets to the partnership and the
subsequent sale of the partnership interests to the purchasing
spouse are not sufficiently interrelated to permit the steptransaction doctrine to be invoked, see, e.g., Jay A. Soled, “Use
of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies,” 42 B.C. L. Rev. 587 (2001) (discussing the doctrine in the
transfer tax context), it would seem that the purchasing
spouse should not be viewed as having made the requisite
transfer.
120
In structuring a partnership to qualify as a pooling, care
must be taken in drafting the partnership agreement. See
Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246
(holding that no pooling had occurred because the children
had not made a genuine contribution given that, under the
partnership agreement, the economic benefits generated by
the assets they had contributed would be allocated to them
solely and not to the decedent).
119
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wise, the Service would argue that, under the steptransaction doctrine, a pooling did not occur. Thus, for
families who have members in lower generations with
independent wealth, as long as the business-purpose
test can be satisfied, the pooling approach may be relatively easy to implement. It would allow each contributing partner to retain full voting rights as to liquidation and distributions without running afoul of
Strangi’s alternative holding, provided the partnership
can satisfy the business-purpose requirement.
Pooling may not, however, be the perfect solution.
As indicated, lower-generation family members must
have independent wealth, and that often will not be
the case. Also, some might be concerned that a pooling
could cause a taxable gift to occur at the time of formation: Strangi I intimated, in rejecting the Service’s
gift-on-formation argument, that the decedent’s retention of virtually all of the interests in the partnership
was crucial to its reasoning. In a pooling, in contrast,
no one contributing partner receives all interests in the
partnership, thus creating the possibility that the Service might be able to argue successfully that a gift on
formation occurs in the case of a pooling. Although, in
Jones,121 the court appears to retreat from its intimation
in Strangi I — indicating that no gift on formation can
occur if all contributions are properly reflected in each
contributing partner’s capital account — cautious advisers might prefer a structure that would be unquestionably invulnerable to a gift-on-formation argument.
One such structure that could be easily implemented
is the structure adopted in Strangi with one critical
modification: Upon formation, as in Strangi, the contributing partner receives a 99 percent limited partnership interest and a 47 percent stock interest in the general partner; however, unlike Strangi, the governing
documents provide that the stock and partnership interests are not permitted to vote on liquidation or distributions.122 Under this structure, Strangi’s alternative
holding could not apply given that, at the time of
death, the decedent does not hold any problematic
voting rights. And even if death were to occur within
three years of partnership formation, section 2035
should not apply inasmuch as the decedent never held
the voting rights.123
Three concerns might be raised, however, about this
structure. First, the Service might argue that Strangi’s
alternative holding should be extended to cover this
121

Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 121, 127-28 (2001).
If, instead, the contributing partner were to receive
partnership interests and stock carrying full voting rights
and then amend the governing documents to eliminate them,
a taxable gift may occur under section 2704.
123
See Leder v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that section 2035 does not apply where the decedent
did not directly own the transferred interest or right); Estate
of Headrick v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1990). For
a critique of these cases, see Jeffrey G. Sherman, “Hairsplitting Under IRC 2035(d): The Cause and the Cure,” 16 Va. Tax
Rev. 111 (1996). Note that if the contributing partner were to
receive a partnership interest or stock carrying full voting
rights and then surrender these rights, section 2035 would
apply if death occurred within three years of the amendment
effecting the surrender.
122
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type of arrangement on the ground that the decedent
could have joined with the owners of the 53 percent
interest in the general partner to amend the governing
documents and thereby confer full voting rights on the
47 percent stock interest and the 99 percent limited
partnership interest. Although such an argument appears to be a rather weak one given the voting limitation, it would be prudent, perhaps, to prohibit expressly any such amendment (or to prohibit the contributing
partner from participating in such an amendment
process). It is, of course, difficult to predict whether
such a prohibition would suffice. Second, for those who
remain concerned about a gift-on-formation argument,
it must be conceded that the limitation on voting could
be the basis for an argument that the contributing
partner did not retain, unlike Strangi, virtually all of
the partnership interests. Third, some clients may be
made uncomfortable by their limited ability to control
the partnership under this structure.
For married clients, these concerns could be largely,
if not entirely, eliminated under a different structure.
If one spouse were to make the contribution of assets
to the partnership and the other spouse were to be
made the sole limited partner and were to own all
interests in the entity serving as the general partner,
the availability of the marital deduction should
preclude the Service from taking a gift-on-formation
position. And any Service argument that the ability to
amend the governing documents should trigger section
2036(a)(2) would certainly be even more attenuated
given that the noncontributing spouse owns exclusively all interests. In terms of control, while the contributing spouse would as a nonowner be unable to exercise any direct influence, the other spouse would have
complete control over all partnership issues. At the
death of the contributing spouse, the absence of all
ownership, as well as voting rights, should prevent the
Service from invoking Strangi’s alternative holding.124
And even if the contributing spouse should die within
three years of partnership formation, section 2035
should not apply.125 At the same time, section 2036
cannot apply at the death of the noncontributing
spouse, thus preserving the discount,126 since the asset
transfer was made by the contributing spouse.127
124
This structure should also enable the estate to defeat any
section 2036(a)(1) argument the Service might make (provided
that no distributions are made to the contributing spouse).
125
Not having ever owned an interest in the partnership,
the contributing spouse should not be treated as having made
a transfer within the meaning of section 2035. See note 123
supra.
126
To preserve the discount in the partner ’s spouse’s estate, it would be advisable for the partner spouse to transfer
any interest in the general partner before death. Otherwise,
the Service would, presumably, argue that the discount
should be eliminated under an aggregation theory (citing,
perhaps, Ahmanson Foundation v. U.S., 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.
1981); Treas. reg. section 25.2704-1(f) example 5).
127
If it were established that the noncontributing spouse
had indirectly supplied the assets contributed to the partnership, the Service would be able to employ the step-transac-
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For unmarried clients or those who are uncomfortable ceding control to a spouse, a structure utilizing an
incomplete gift trust might be appropriate. 128 Upon
partnership formation, the contributing partner would
receive all of the limited partnership interests, which
would carry no voting rights as to liquidation or distributions. An incomplete gift trust would be designated as the owner of the general partner.129 With the
contributing partner deemed to owned all interests for
transfer tax purposes, the Service would again be unable to make a gift-on-formation argument.130 And
given the trustee’s exclusive control over the general
partner and the limitation on the contributing partner’s
voting rights with regard to the limited partnership
interest, Strangi’s alternative holding should not apply.
Nor, if the contributing partner were to die within three
years of partnership formation, should section 2035
apply since ownership of the general partner was
vested in the trustee from inception.131
As indicated in the discussion of restructuring existing partnerships, there is a variation on the incomplete gift trust that would permit the contributing
partner to retain more direct influence over the partnership: The use of the incomplete gift trust as the owner
of the limited partnership interest with the contributing partner retaining an ownership interest in the
general partner. As suggested, Strangi’s alternative
holding might arguably in this context only to that
portion of the partnership’s assets corresponding to the
general partner’s percentage interest in the partnership.132

tion doctrine to cast the noncontributing spouse as the real
transferor and thereby invoke section 2036(a)(2). See note 119
supra.
128
As indicated in the existing-partnership discussion, the
trust instrument might be fashioned to give the grantor some
influence over the trustee and, perhaps, some access to
partnership assets. See notes 102 and 103 supra.
129
As suggested previously, the grantor (i.e., the contributing partner) could retain the right under the trust instrument, if properly drafted, to remove and replace the trustee.
See note supra.
130
If the trust were drafted to qualify as a grantor trust, it
would be disregarded for all income tax purposes. See Rev.
Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. See also Jonathan G. Blattmachr,
Mitchell M. Gans, and Hugh Jacobson, “Income Tax Effects
of Termination of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the
Grantor’s Death,” 97 J. Tax’n 149 (2002). And since at least
two owners are required to have a partnership for income
tax purposes, see Treas. reg. section 301.7701-3(a), it is likely
that the partnership will not be recognized as such for income
tax purposes if the trust qualifies as a grantor trust. While
this should not affect the availability of discounts for transfer
tax purposes, caution might suggest that the trust be drafted
as a nongrantor trust.
131
See note 107 supra.
132
See notes 108 and 109 and accompanying text supra.
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V. Planning and Section 2036(a)(1)
One final caution is appropriate. Strangi, as well as
the earlier partnership cases on which it relies,133
denied the claimed discount on two grounds, section
2026(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2). Although the focus of this
article was on the latter provision, those who fail to
address the risk posed by the former provision do so
at their peril. For if either provision is found to be
applicable, no discount will be allowed (and, as discussed, previous gifts of limited partnership interests
may be ignored134). Thus, in addition to adopting one
of the suggested structures, additional precautions
must be taken to minimize the section 2036(a)(1) risk.
First, partnership distributions should not be made
to the contributing partner. Indeed, it may be prudent
to include in the partnership agreement a prohibition
against distributions during the partnership’s term.
Given that the section 2036(a)(1) argument turns on
whether there was an implied understanding at the
time of the initial transfer that possession would be
retained, it would appear that a lack of distributions
would create an insurmountable hurdle for any section
2036(a)(1) argument the Service might make. Second,
closely related to the first suggestion, the contributing
partner must retain outside of the partnership sufficient assets to continue funding the normal cost of
living, as well as any anticipated estate tax and cost of
estate administration. Third, personal use assets
should not be contributed to the partnership. Fourth,
needless to say, the partnership should be carefully
respected, with no commingling of assets. Fifth, if
feasible, consideration should be given to forming the
partnership through a pooling of capital from different
family members.
For those who are married, a suggestion made previously regarding new partnerships could prove to be
a valuable strategy for avoiding section 2036(a)(1), as
well as section 2036(a)(2). If one spouse were to contribute assets to the partnership, the other spouse were
to receive the partnership interests, and no distributions were made to the contributing spouse, the following conclusions would appear to be appropriate. First,
section 2036 should not apply with respect to the
partnership’s assets at the death of the partner spouse
(given that the contributing spouse, not the partner
spouse, made the transfer of the assets to the partnership). Second, provided that the partner spouse no
longer controls the general partner at the time of death,
the limited partnership interest should be entitled to
an appropriate discount. Third, section 2035 should not
apply even if the contributing spouse were to die
within three years. Fourth, section 2036 should not
apply with respect to the partnership’s assets at the

133
See Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121,
Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-246; Estate
of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 144 (2000); Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242, Doc 9715298 (11 pages), 97 TNT 103-7.
134
See note 110 supra.
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death of the contributing spouse (assuming no distributions are in fact made to the contributing spouse).
In the case of existing partnerships where distributions have been made, consideration must obviously
be given to discontinuing the practice. Whether this
would suffice to show that there was no implied agreement to retain possession at the outset is, of course, not
clear. And whether section 2035 would apply if the
discontinuation were to occur within three years of
death is also unclear (though, as previously suggested,
for a married couple, an interspousal sale at a price
based on the undiscounted value of the partnership
assets should make it more difficult for the Service to
invoke section 2035). For those clients who cannot afford to forgo distributions, perhaps a sale of the
partnership interests (conceivably to a grantor trust to
avoid taxable gain for income tax purposes) would
demonstrate the absence of an implied agreement or
would permit an argument that any implied understanding terminated at the time of the sale (but this
argument might presumably trigger section 2035 if the
client were to die within three years of the sale). Finally,
as an alternative to a sale, the partnership might be
divided into two separate partnerships, with distributions continuing to be made by one of the partnerships
and distributions ceasing to be made for the other (perhaps even amending the agreement for the latter
partnership to prohibit distributions).

Conclusion
Strangi’s alternative holding is an understandable
response to abusive family partnerships. It misreads,
however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Byrum and
is therefore of doubtful validity. Nevertheless, as a Tax
Court decision, it cannot be cavalierly disregarded in
planning. At first blush, if one assumes that it will
withstand a Byrum challenge, it appears to create an
insurmountable threat to virtually all family partnerships. On further reflection, however, it becomes apparent that, if properly addressed in the structuring of
new partnerships and the restructuring of old ones, its
threat can be neutralized. Indeed, as a practical matter,
Strangi’s alternative holding will be significant only for
those who are unaware of it or who otherwise fail to
do the proper planning, thus suggesting that as a matter of policy its solution to family-partnership abuse
is, at best, an imperfect one.
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